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The bodily self is at the root of human nature and pivotal in our interactions with the environment. Recent advances 
in cognitive neuroscience have challenged our understanding of the experience of the body as our own, i.e., the 
immediate and self-specific representation of body-related information. 
At present, there is a wide consensus that at least two fundamental components contribute to the experience of the 
bodily self: body ownership (i.e., the sense that bodily states are perceived as mine) and sense of agency (i.e., the 
feeling of intending and controlling willed actions). Both are omnipresent during movements but denote different 
aspects of bodily experience. Indeed, whereas the sense of agency is only present during voluntary actions, thus 
seems dependent on efferent signals, the sense of ownership seems to rely primarily on afferent signals. 
For this proposal, we will address the issue of the complex interplay between body ownership and agency, which 
have implications for understanding both the neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning bodily self and a variety of 
neurological and psychiatric diseases affecting the experience of the own body. In order to obtain a full picture of the 
issue, we will have speakers with different theoretical point of views and/or methodological approaches. 
  
23. Delusional ownership and its relationships with the sense of agency 
Lorenzo Pia, SAMBA (SpAtial, Motor & Bodily Awareness) Research Group Psychology Department & Neuroscience 
Institute of Turin (NIT) University of Turin (Italy) 
A key approach to the understanding of bodily self-consciousness is inferring from patients those information that 
might help to explain intact brain functioning. 
In the present talk, I will present a novel, neurologically-based monothematic delusion of body ownership (i.e., 
patients who misattribute someone else’s arm to themselves) which shows abnormalities at the level of the 
integration among different aspects of body ownership. I will also examine whether and how such altered body 
ownership affects conscious awareness of movements. This evidence suggests that studying the interactions between 
body ownership and sense of agency could be key step for the understanding the nature and the neurocognitive 






24. The body of my own? The sense of ownership and agency in bodily self-recognition 
Andreas Kalckert, Brain , Body & Self Lab, Department of Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm (Sweden) 
Recent research in psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that the experience of the own body can be 
experimentally manipulated. Paradigms like the rubber hand illusion have revealed the basic cognitive and perceptual 
mechanisms of the so-called sense of ownership, the feeling that the body we experience is part of my own. In this 
experiment participants experience a sense of ownership as a consequence of the manipulation of visual and tactile 
stimulation to the hand. We have recently introduced a new version of this experiment, the moving rubber hand 
illusion. These experiments have shown that movements can produce a similar ownership illusion and that the 
illusion relies on similar perceptual principles like the classical paradigm. Crucially though, this experiment 
complements and extends the classical illusion with the sense of agency, the sense that we are in voluntary control of 
our actions. 
Here, I like to review the basic concepts of these experiments and summarize how ownership and agency contribute 
to the experience of the own body. I will also briefly introduce potential implications for research on 
psychopathological conditions. A careful distinction between both these aspects might help us to understand 
conditions, which affect the experience of the own body and its actions. 
  
25. Bimanual coupling: an effective tool to investigate the sense of ownership and agency in pathological 
conditions 
Francesca Garbarini. SAMBA (SpAtial, Motor & Bodily Awareness) Research Group, Psychology Department & 
Neuroscience Institute of Turin (NIT), University of Turin (Italy) 
When people move both hands simultaneously, each motor program imposes constraints to the other (bimanual 
coupling). Here, I will review the basic principles of bimanual paradigms and I will pinpoint how they useful to to 
understand the bodily-self within those pathological conditions in which motor and bodily awareness are altered. In 
the motor domain, I will focus on brain-damaged patients affected by anosognosia for hemiplegia who, despite the 
presence of severe left paralysis, obstinately claim that they can still move their contralesional limbs. By using 
bimanual tasks, both in the spatial and the temporal domain, it has been shown that despite the absence of 
movements, an effective motor intentionality and a spared sense of agency can be present. In the body domain, I will 
focus on brain-damaged patients affected by a specific monothematic delusion of body ownership, namely the 
pathological belief that other people’s body parts belong to their own body. By using a modified version of a 
bimanual task, it has been shown that an altered sense of body ownership profoundly affects the patients’ sense of 
agency (i.e., patients ascribed the alien limb movements to themselves). In summary, these evidence show that 
bimanual tasks are effective tools to investigate body ownership and the sense of agency in pathological conditions, 
unveiling specific aspects, otherwise, hidden in normal functioning brain. 
26. Probing agency and sensation of movement 
Mark Schram Christensen, Copenhagen Neural Control of Movement, Department of Neuroscience and 
Pharmacology & Department of Nutrition, Exercise and Sports, University of Copenhagen (Denmark) 
Sense of agency (SoA) has been, within the framework of the comparator model, been explained by the matching of 
prior intentions of goals of actions with the actual outcome of the movements. Thereby both the formation of action 
goals and sensory feedback become critical for the experience of SoA and of Sensation of Movement (SoM). In this 
talk I will review some of my recent findings pointing towards the importance of either sensory feedback or efferent 
information in the formation of Soa and SoM performed under experimental settings using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation and EEG. Suggesting that the mechanisms involved in SoA and SoM cannot solely be explained by the 
comparator model, but may be much more context sensitive and thereby less simple than previously thought. 
 
 
 
  
